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It is now quite clear that the UK Government has 
completely lost the plot in its attempts to deal with 
traffic and transport problems. It has rejected traffic 
reduction targets after initially agreeing to them, it 
has rejected lower speed limits on rural roads and 
through villages and it is now devoting its efforts to 
making the purchase price of new cars lower. As if 
this wasn’t enough to signal a major political 
withdrawal from the electorally difficult territory of 
reducing our dependence on the car the Government 
has now refused to become involved in the European 
Car-Free Day planned for 22nd September this year. It 
takes the view that this is essentially a local matter 
and must be decided by individual towns and cities.
This re-positioning of a Government that was 
elected in 1997 with one of the biggest majorities in 
parliament ever seen in the UK is full of lessons for 
the world of transport policy. The UK has no shortage 
of good ideas about how to solve transport problems. 
The history of exceptionally innovative traffic 
analysis and understanding is peppered with the 
work of Smeed, Buchanan, Mogridge, Roberts, Adams, 
Hillman and others; all of whom have shown that it 
is not possible to have our cake and eat it in terms of 
ever-rising rates of car ownership and use and ensuring 
that towns and cities are livable and desirable. This 
wealth of intelligence has had to come to terms with 
the political realities which in the main lean in the 
direction of more cars, more use of cars and a staggering 
underestimation of the damaging consequences of this 
auto-centred approach.
The main lesson to be drawn from this history is a 
hard one. Progress does not come from clear, articulate 
analysis. The Government knows about the health 
impacts of traffic, the rapidly escalating problems of 
climate change and the impossibility of paying for 
and maintaining transport infrastructure up to the 
task of 100% car ownership, car parking requirements 
and use of cars for every trip greater than 50 metres. It 
knows that new roads do not solve traffic congestion 
problems and do not bring about the economic miracle 
that is supposed to follow a new road. It knows that 
poor people suffer more from appalling noise, air 
quality and traffic danger environments than do rich 
people. Contemporary highly paid professionals are 
just as adept at escaping from the highly unpleasant 
world of traffic (which they create) as were their 
Victorian predecessors in escaping the dark, satanic 
mills (which they created). We have an overload of 
information and a deficit of backbone to do anything 
about it.
There is a glimmer of light in what is going on 
elsewhere in Europe. The enthusiastic application of 
car-free days in France and Italy is certainly not a 
fully packaged transport solution but it is showing 
millions of people the kind of world that normally 
doesn’t even begin to penetrate the consciousness of 
those locked into car dependency. This is the sadness 
of the UK’s thoughtless denial of 22nd September. Car 
dependency is a psychological problem and the start 
of any solution has to be the growing awareness that 
things could be better if there were fewer cars around 
or if ordinary, everyday journeys could be made by an 
alternative to the car. The main positive lesson of the 
dreary history of traffic and transport policy in 
Britain in the last 50 years is that we have to find 
ways to show that there is a huge improvement in 
health, quality of life, sociability and 
neighbourliness just around the corner and it is there to 
be liberated if only we can put the genie back in the 
bottle and get on with a life that celebrates the joy of 
human contact, the richness of public space and the 
pleasure of being freed from servicing the metal box 
that offers so much and yet delivers so little.
Writing in 1933 in Street Traffic Flow (p. 375) 
Henry Watson concluded his analysis with:
‘In the future the central areas of great cities will 
be closed to private vehicles of limited utility…’
Almost 70 years later we are still waiting. I 
wonder what Henry Watson would have made of our 
craven inability even to think of one car free day in a 
year.
John Whitelegg
Editor
World Transport Policy & Practice
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Abstract
The Vasco da Gama bridge over the Tagus Estuary 
was one of the most polemic projects ever built in 
Portugal and indeed in the European Union. Benefiting 
from significant funding from the Cohesion Fund, the 
project failed to uphold its main declared objectives 
(decongesting the old bridge and providing a north-
south link around Lisbon), and its location was the 
worst of three alternatives regarding land 
management, nature conservation, transportation 
system and cost. It was nevertheless forwarded by the 
will of the very powerful Portuguese Ministry of 
Public Works (against opinions of almost everybody 
else), aided by the unwillingness of the European 
Commission to withdraw financing. However, the 
public outrage raised around the project both in 
Portugal and in Europe, not only for the sloppy 
decision but also for illegal impacts during 
construction, led to several stringent control and 
compensatory measures, unprecedented in Portugal and 
rare in Europe.
Keywords
Cohesion Fund, Environmental Impact Assessment, 
European Union, Lisbon, NGO, Tagus Estuary.
Introduction
The new Vasco da Gama bridge over the Tagus 
Estuary was commissioned in 1998. It is one of the 
longest in Europe, but unfortunately it became well 
known for much less auspicious motives. From the 
original decision to this day (and probably for years 
to come), the project has generated unprecedented 
controversy in Portugal and Europe, for a number of 
reasons:
• It does not fulfil any of the goals it was supposed to 
meet, and indeed impedes the resolution of 
problems it was supposed to solve;
• The choice of location for the bridge was, by all 
accounts, the worst possible option;
• It creates very significant negative social, 
ecological and economic impacts;
• It was made possible only by heavy EU financing, 
despite multiple violations of European 
regulations. In short, this project has become a 
textbook example of poor decision making, sloppy 
economics, poor use of public money and excessive 
environmental impact fostered by public works. On 
the other hand, the huge problems it conjured up 
led to the creation of an observation committee, 
Comissão de Acompanhamento da Obra (CAO), 
which is unique in Portugal and has in turn become 
a textbook example of co-operative efforts to 
mitigate impacts of a major project (not always 
successful, but nevertheless valiant).
This paper briefly describes the decision process 
that led to the new bridge and explores the 
environmental, economic and financial consequences; 
then it proceeds to discuss the role of the EU in the 
process, the current problems in land use planning and 
the role of CAO. The reader will notice that decisions 
of Portuguese and European authorities are 
apparently senseless and often contradict available 
technical background information. If in doubt, the 
reader is strongly advised to check on source documents 
(now in the public record), because the whole affair is 
incredible to the untutored observer.
The decision process
In 1991 the Portuguese Government created the 
Office for the Crossing of the Tagus at Lisbon, 
Gabinete para a Travessia do Tejo em Lisboa 
(GATTEL), an inter-ministerial agency chaired by the 
Ministry of Public Works, Ministério das Obras 
Públicas Transportes e Communicações (MOPTC), with 
representatives of the Ministries of Planning 
(Ministério do Planeamento e Administração do 
Território), Environment (Ministério do Ambiente e 
Recursos Naturais) and Finance (Ministério das 
Finanças). GATTEL was charged with the 
development of a new road crossing of the Tagus 
Estuary, with two clear cut goals: solving the ever-
increasing traffic jam on the old ‘25 Abril’ bridge at 
Almada; and supporting the north-south traffic
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around Lisbon.
One should note that the Tagus Estuary at Lisbon is 
very broad (up to 20 km in places) and any new 
crossing is an expensive, technically challenging 
enterprise. GATTEL was directed to consider road 
transport only, without any integrated land use 
management or transportation perspective. Unco-
ordinated to the work of GATTEL, studies went on to 
install a heavy railway on the old bridge and to 
create the Regional Land Use Plan for the 
Metropolitan Area of Lisbon, Plano Regional de 
Ordenamento do Território da Área Metropolitana de 
Lisboa (PROTAML).
By September 1991, GATTEL issued a series of 
studies (GATTEL, 1991) comparing three corridors for 
a new road bridge: eastern (Sacavém–Montijo), central 
(Chelas–Barreiro) and western (Algés–Trafaria). At 
the time, little of this information was released and 
no Environmental Impact Assessment or public 
auditing was conducted. Public debate was promoted 
only by non-Governmental organisations, both 
professional and environmental. Opinions fell to two 
global alternatives, linked to opposite development 
strategies for the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon:
• The ‘MOPTC option’: Sacavém–Montijo road 
bridge, complemented with heavy railway on the 
old 25 Abril bridge and eventually a new 
Chelas–Barreiro railway bridge. This option was 
based on a strategy of opening new urban 
development fronts, top priority to roadways and 
individual transport. It was actively and loudly 
supported by the Minister of Public Works and the 
municipalities of Montijo and Alcochete;
• The ‘Rest of the World option’: Chelas–Barreiro 
rail and road bridge, complemented with a light 
railway on the old bridge. This option was based 
on a strategy of urban regeneration, an integrated 
approach to land use and transportation, and 
priority for public transport. It was supported by 
the Ministries of Planning, Environment, Industry, 
Employment, Defence and Justice (among others), 
by the planning office and GATTEL’s consultants, 
by the PROTAML team, by the municipalities of 
Almada, Barreiro, Seixal and Moita, by the mayor 
and the municipal 
planning office at Lisbon, 
by environmental NGOs 
and by the majority of 
experts on transport, land 
management and 
environment.
The Sacavém–Montijo 
route crosses a Special 
Protected Area under the 
European Birds Directive, 
which is considered one of 
the ten most important 
wetlands in Europe. It does 
not solve the two major 
problems (congestion on the 
old bridge and north-south 
link), because it is away 
from populated areas. It 
causes major impacts on 
wildlife (bird and fish 
habitats), generates road 
traffic and agricultural 
land is urbanised. Official 
reports (GATTEL, 1991; 
MPAT, 1992) show that 
the ‘Rest of the World 
option’ would fare much 
better in solving 
transportation and 
Figure 1: The Tagus Estuary and the alternative crossings in 1991
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development problems, would be less expensive and 
would induce far less impacts. The reason is 
immediately apparent just by looking at a map of 
the region (see Figure 1): the area around Barreiro 
is much more urbanised and populated, by a factor 
of ten, than the vicinity of Montijo.
The question that now springs to the mind of any 
and every observer is: Why on earth was the 
MOPTC’s Sacavém–Montijo road bridge option 
chosen?
Unfortunately, the answer is unfathomable. One 
can just say that nearly all stakeholder positions were 
founded on objective, if misguided reasons. For 
instance, the municipalities of Montijo and Alcochete 
favoured the Montijo location because, quite clearly, 
they were bound to gain (politically and financially) 
with that location for the new crossing. The one 
exception, the never satisfactorily explained position, 
was that of the Minister of Public Works.
This forceful, unfounded position of the Minister of 
Public Works prevailed over an unorganised 
opposition, and the Sacavém–Montijo bridge was 
approved by Government in July 1992. The draft 
PROTAML that recommended the ‘Rest of the World 
option’, was ordered back to redrafting. Legislation 
was approved to establish the location and financing 
model of the bridge, based on a joint concession of the 
new and the old bridges – with much higher tolls 
than before.
A major hurdle appeared, predictably, in June 1994, 
when the tolls on the old bridge were raised by 50%; 
this was to be a first step of a programmed 250% toll 
increase, preparing for the takeover by Lusoponte (the 
chosen contractor). The ensuing public outrage became 
the biggest political crisis of the decade, and 
shattered the ‘financial engineering’ of the project, 
based on toll revenues – of which over 80% would come 
from the old bridge. The Government had to make a 
number of concessions, both to the old 25 Abril bridge 
users and to Lusoponte; amongst them, no further toll 
raising. Henceforth, the project became heavily 
dependent on the Government budget.
By summer 1994, the Environmental Impact 
Statement (drafted for the Sacavém–Montijo option 
only) was issued and reviewed, receiving inordinately 
harsh criticism from the scientific community, the 
Government agencies and environmental NGOs. For 
example, the Ministry of the Environment Evaluation 
Committee noted that: 
‘The Environmental Impact Statement does not 
justify the project. There is no evidence of the goals 
stated in the EIS (diverting north-south and 
Spain-bound heavy traffic from the urban centre 
and solving the saturation of the existing 25 Abril 
bridge) being met by the project. In truth, 
additional information commissioned by the 
Evaluation Committee imply that the 25 Abril 
bridge will continue to present high saturation 
rates. Furthermore, the volume of regional heavy 
traffic crossing the existing bridge is already very 
small.’ (MARN, 1994, p. 35). 
Despite this criticism by the Ministry of the 
Environment, by the end of 1994 the project had been 
approved by the Portuguese Government and by the 
EU’s Cohesion Fund.
All these decisions and violations by Portuguese 
and European authorities, and others by Lusoponte, 
were strongly opposed by environmental NGOs, led by 
GEOTA (Grupo de Estudos de Ordenamento do 
Território e Ambiente) and LPN (Liga para a 
Protecção da Natureza). They mounted a public 
campaign and filed some eight lawsuits for 
infringement of Directives 85/337/EEC 
(Environmental Impact Assessment), 79/409/EEC 
(Birdlife), 92/43/EEC (Habitats) and other 
legislation; some of which are still pending in the 
courts. In addition, they placed a long list of 
complaints before the European Commission.
The last opportunity to stop the project was missed 
when the new Government, elected in October 1995, 
decided to keep the project going, despite openly 
considering it totally inadequate to fulfil its stated 
goals. The decision to carry on may have been pressed 
by the upcoming Expo ’98 (the World Exposition in 
Lisbon from May to September), and by the financial 
commitments already assumed by the Portuguese 
State.
Non-compliance with project goals
All official documents issued by the Portuguese 
Government are unanimous in defining two goals for 
the new crossing of the Tagus at Lisbon: alleviating 
traffic on the old 25 Abril bridge and providing a 
north-south link around Lisbon. These goals are 
clearly stated in the preamble of Decreto-Lei no. 14-
A/91 de 9 de Janeiro, the Government Decree creating 
GATTEL; in the application to the Cohesion Fund 
(MPAT, 1994); and in the Environmental Impact 
Statement for the Montijo bridge (GATTEL/ 
Lusoponte/Coba, 1994, Tomo I, p. 3).
Amazingly, according to all available data, the 
Sacavém–Montijo bridge quite clearly does not satisfy 
any of its pretended goals.
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Let us briefly examine the official reports.
Regarding the north-south link: 
‘The traffic crossing the AML (Metropolitan Area 
of Lisbon), so without origin or destination in the 
AML, represents only 0.2% of light vehicle traffic 
crossing the Tagus at Lisbon and 0.3% of heavy 
traffic … The analysis performed shows that none 
of the corridors under consideration (western, 
central and eastern) is interesting as far as the 
improvement of the north-south link of the country 
is concerned’ (GATTEL, 1991, report 4, p. 2.14). 
Thus the so-called north-south link does not 
explain, either the need for a new bridge, or the 
insertion of the bridge in the national network. As for 
the Spain-bound traffic, it is insignificant and not 
even quantified in official reports. On the contrary, 
the future Tagus crossing at Carregado (located about 
30 km upstream from Lisbon), which has been planned 
for about fifteen years, will unquestionably become 
the main north-south crossing, and the best route 
between Setúbal and the West and North of the 
country, around Lisbon.
Regarding the traffic congestion of the existing 
bridge:
‘The eastern corridor does not contribute 
significantly to relieve the saturation of the 
existing bridge’ (GATTEL, 1991, report 6, p. 18). 
All traffic experts agree that the traffic overload 
of the old bridge can be solved only by railway 
crossings and a significant improvement of public 
transportation modes and nodes. However, the 
corollary of this evidence – priority for railway 
crossings – was never accepted by the Government. But 
even if the priority for roadways was right, there is 
no justification for the choice of the Sacavém–Montijo 
route. According to GATTEL (1991, report 4, p. 3.106), a 
bridge on the eastern corridor (Montijo) would divert 
up to 19% of the traffic on the old bridge, on the 
central corridor (Barreiro) up to 46% and on the 
western corridor (Trafaria) up to 99%. The same trend 
was confirmed by the traffic studies supporting the 
application to the Cohesion fund (MPAT, 1994).
According to this official 1994 document, accepted 
by the European Commission, the new bridge would 
generate a surplus of seven million vehicles in 1998, 
above and beyond normal traffic growth rates (see 
Figure 2). That is, the new bridge generates its own 
traffic by promoting urban growth, but does not divert 
significantly the traffic from the old bridge, for the 
very simple reason that it is too far away from 
existing major urban areas. This prediction was 
confirmed in full with real data (see Table 1).
In the period between 1992 and 1995 the Minister of 
Public Works invoked several reasons (besides the 
decongestion of the old bridge and the north-south 
link) to justify his preference for the Montijo location. 
Those accessory reasons were however never assumed 
in formal Government papers, so they will not be 
discussed in detail here. Let us just say that his 
opinions were not shared by his Government 
colleagues, and were essentially contradictory with 
the official data, as demonstrated by, e.g. Melo 
(1995), Shmidt (1995), Granado (1996), and many 
other analysts.
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Figure 2: Traffic estimates in the application to the Cohesion Fund
Unit: million vehicles per annum (sum of traffic in both directions)
Source: MPAT, 1994.
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One may note that the percent distribution of 
traffic between the two bridges (CCRLVT, 2000b) is 
remarkably close to early predictions. However, the 
total traffic is significantly higher than expected, 
especially on the new Vasco da Gama bridge. This 
discrepancy can be explained by two factors:
• The 1991 studies by GATTEL assumed that 
Governmental policy would promote public 
transportation. This did not happen. The most 
important project to reduce traffic on the 25 Abril 
bridge, the Southern Bank Light Train, that 
should interface with the bridge train, is at least 6 
years behind schedule. This ‘policy for cars but no 
transportation policy’ affects other public 
transport projects on both sides of the estuary, 
including new interchanges and the modern Lisbon 
tramway system. Therefore, increasing road 
construction has provoked an inordinate traffic 
increase;
• A significant share (as yet not quantified) of the 
traffic currently crossing the Vasco da Gama bridge 
is probably north-south traffic. This traffic will 
disappear, however, when a new bridge is built 
upriver at Carregado, because it is a much more 
practical and cheaper north-south route. The 
Carregado bridge should be in place in a few years, 
according to current planning.
The environmental impacts
It was clear from the earliest studies that the 
Sacavém–Montijo route, besides not complying with 
pretended goals, had the worst environmental impact 
of the alternatives considered: 
‘The eastern corridor presents the highest 
environmental hazards’ (GATTEL, 1991, report 4, 
p. 3.33);
‘it promotes the extension and dispersion of urban 
development, with highest facility building 
effort; it is grounded on the southern bank in an 
area where urban structure to support rapid 
development is very fragile; it presents relevant 
negative effects on the Tagus Estuary, terrestrial 
ecosystems and environmentally 
sensitive areas’ (GATTEL, 1991, 
report 6, p. 18).
The Environmental Impact 
Assessment of the Sacavém–Montijo 
bridge, in 1994, confirmed the 
earlier prognosis: 
‘The Evaluation Committee 
concludes that this project, by its 
features and dimension, will 
cause changes with regional scope … amongst 
which the most significant impacts are: land 
management, economic and social issues, especially 
on the southern bank; the ecological equilibrium of 
the estuary and surrounding areas. The Evaluation 
Committee notes very significant negative impacts, 
some not subject to mitigation, and others that need 
more thorough study to allow for any meaningful 
mitigation.’ (MARN, 1994, p. 36).
Unfortunately, not only were these warnings 
overlooked and the project approved, but also many of 
the mitigation measures proposed in the 
Environmental Impact Statement, or demanded by 
Portuguese and European authorities, failed to be 
enforced.
Major violations by either Lusoponte, the 
Portuguese Government or the municipalities included:
• An attempt to cut the Tagus Estuary Special 
Protection Area (SPA) on the northern bank, to 
build a new highway right over the bank (this 
project was later redesigned to affect the SPA as 
little as possible);
• Construction works on Samouco saltpans (southern 
bank) during the bird nesting season;
• Dredging operations during incoming tide in 
sensitive areas;
• Dumping of dredged sediments outside designated 
areas. Particularly, dumping of contaminated 
sediments inside the estuary, with yet unknown 
consequences. Such materials were supposed to be 
dumped off the coast, but according to Lisbon 
harbour records, only 2% of the contaminated 
sediments were actually dumped outside the 
estuary, and even then there is evidence that they 
did not reach the designated destination (Granado, 
1996);
• Failure to fence off construction grounds, resulting in 
bird life disturbance and, more seriously, the 
deaths of two children who drowned in an 
unprotected ditch;
• Approval of urban developments inside the SPA;
Table 1: Traffic crossing the Tagus at Lisbon, 1997 to 1999
25 Abril bridge Vasco da Gama bridge Total
1997 50.2 0.0 50.2
1998 49.3 10.2 59.5
1999 57.0 15.9 72.9
Unit: million vehicles per annum (sum of traffic in both directions) 
Source: CCRLVT (2000) citing Lusoponte, corrected with data from Junta 
Autónoma de Estradas
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• Failure to approve meaningful land use 
management instruments, namely the PROTAML.
All these violations were known to Portuguese 
authorities, were denounced over time by the NGOs to 
the European Commission, and were presented in the 
media with hard evidence. To no avail. The action of 
the authorities was always too little, too late, if 
ever.
The economics
The alleged lower cost was at some point one of the 
arguments of the Minister of Public Works to justify 
the option for the Montijo bridge. However, this 
argument, like all the others, was contradicted by 
official reports. For instance, the Council for Public 
Works and Transport, that compared road-only 
corridors found the following: 
‘Regarding the technical solutions and 
corresponding costs: On the eastern and central 
corridors no special problems are foreseeable in the 
foundations, therefore cost per kilometre is judged 
to be similar in both corridors; on the eastern 
corridor there may be technical problems of some 
complexity, such as found in the construction of the 
25 Abril bridge.’ (CSOPT, 1992, p. 24)
But what was really at stake was not the cost of a 
road bridge standing by itself, but the cost of the 
overall transport system and the level of service 
provided to users. Official reports show that a road 
and rail bridge at Chelas–Barreiro plus a light 
railway on the existing 25 Abril bridge would be much 
cheaper than a road bridge at Sacavém–Montijo plus a 
heavy railway on the 25 Abril bridge, in addition to 
the cost of urban facilities and added travel cost – see 
Table 2.
Although these figures are tentative, the 
conclusion is beyond doubt. For a similar level of 
service (two roadways, two railways), and not 
accounting for further consequences regarding 
environment impact and regional development, the 
‘MOPTC option’ is € 790 million (or greater than one-
third) more expensive then the ‘Rest of the World 
option’.
The project finance is equally grim. The Contract 
between the Portuguese State and Lusoponte 
established, as a matter of principle, that the 
revenues of the concession should come from tolls on 
both bridges, and, supposedly, the financial risks 
should fall to Lusoponte. The reality, however, is 
somewhat different. First, the public outcry in 1994 
saw to it that the tolls would not increase as 
programmed, hence the State Budget is paying 
something around € 25 million per year to Lusoponte 
as compensation. What should have been an exception 
clause became the main revenue of Lusoponte. Second, 
the contract contains a number of clauses that, in 
practice, transfer most of the financial risk to the 
Portuguese State. Clause 101.1 is instructive:
Taking into account the distribution of risk stated 
in article 99, Lusoponte will have the right to the 
reposition of financial equilibrium, in the 
following cases: 
a) Unilateral modification of the conditions of 
activities integrated in the Concession, if, as a 
result of such modification, a significant 
reduction of revenue or added cost ensues; 
b) Unpredictable circumstances according to 
article 92, except if, as a result, ensues the 
resolution of the Contract according to number 
92.3;
c) Exceptionally serious perturbations in the 
foreign exchange market which provokes 
Table 2: Tagus crossing cost comparisons
MOPTC option (2 new bridges) Rest of the World option (1 bridge)
Building new bridges Sacavém-Montijo road bridge 850 Chelas-Barreiro road + heavy rail 1400
Chelas-Barreiro heavy rail 850
Complementary access works Sacavém-Montijo road 35 Chelas-Barreiro road 90
Chelas-Barreiro rail 40 Chelas-Barreiro rail 40
Reinforcing 25 Abril bridge road 150 road 150
heavy rail 500 light rail 350
New urban infrastructure 330 70
Additional travel, 25 years 135 -
Total Cost 2890 2100
Unit: Million Euros
Source: MPAT (1992) and AR (1994), adapted by Melo (1995)
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substantial changes in the principles of the 
Base Case; 
d) Legislative changes that have a significant 
direct impact on revenues or operation costs of 
the crossings; 
e) Cases where the right to the reposition of 
financial equilibrium are specifically granted 
in the Contract …’ (Clause 101.1)
If we overlook the warranties for unpredictable 
situations, diminishing tolls and foreign exchange 
unbalance, there is still one fundamental issue: traffic. 
Clause 101.1 implies that, whenever foreseen toll 
revenues fail for any reason resulting from State 
policy, the State must compensate Lusoponte. Changes 
in the amount of traffic in relation to the Base Case, 
caused for instance by incentives to use public 
transportation, may fall into such a category, because 
the Base Case has little flexibility regarding 
passenger transfer to alternative modes, be it railway, 
boat or road. Thus, significant investments in public 
transportation may result in the State paying 
substantial amounts of compensation to Lusoponte. 
Depending on the difference between programmed and 
actual tolls, and the difference between forecast and 
actual traffic, the transfers from the State Budget to 
Lusoponte may increase to € 50 million per year, or 
more, within twenty years.
The on-going land use planning problem
It is a well-known phenomenon that a new road, 
especially a river crossing, generates traffic and urban 
growth; moreover in a suburban area. The bridge 
influence is more worrying because this is a still 
largely rural area, with little capacity to 
accommodate rapid urban growth, insufficient urban 
facilities (from sewerage to public transportation), 
and on the doorstep of the Tagus Estuary SPA. This is 
why land use planning is a key issue here.
Uncontrolled urban growth is one of the most 
serious impacts of the new bridge, and one that was 
little and poorly studied in the 1994 Environmental 
Impact Statement (see, e.g., MARN, 1994, pp. 14-15). 
Although this has been recognised as a very serious 
failure, for nearly five years no effort was made by 
the authorities to gather information to evaluate the 
impact of the bridge on land use, despite repeated 
demands from the environmental NGOs, at CAO 
(1996/98a) and elsewhere (GEOTA/LPN/Quercus, 
1998).
Only recently the so-called ‘observatory of land 
use on the south bank’ was furnished with adequate 
staff and funding to gather information on the issue. 
The first report with some hard data was released in 
July, 1999 (CCRLVT, 1999).
The Environmental Impact Statement, 
(GATTEL/Lusoponte/Coba, 1994) listed a vast number 
of issues and specific actions regarding land use 
management and urban control (see EIS, tomo II, 
volume 3, pp. 75-86). These actions and measures are 
synthetically described in table 9.2.1(7) of the same 
volume of the EIS. Unlike mitigation measures for 
construction works (that fall mostly to Lusoponte), 
land management and urban control measures fall to 
either the municipalities (local scale) or the 
Government (regional scale). Regional level is the 
most important, as recognised by the EIS and the 
Ministry of the Environment’s Evaluation Committee.
The major issue at municipal level was the 
approval and integration of the bridge in the 
municipal land management plans, Plano Director 
Municipal (PDM). However, a PDM, or a collection of 
PDM, do not fulfil any of the regional goals. A PDM is 
purely municipal and limited in scope. It is checked by 
the Government for legality, but it does not undergo 
any evaluation of merit regarding regional or national 
criteria other than law. It does not and cannot address 
issues like regional integration, total urban growth in 
the area, urban facilities, transportation, 
demographic changes or ecological corridors between 
protected areas – all of which are essential for any 
meaningful land management and urban control.
Among the recommendations of the 1994 EIS, the 
following should be outlined:
1) Improving the mobility in the region, regarding 
especially the public transportation and the road-
rail interfaces (p. 78);
2) Definition of urban green areas and semi-natural 
areas at the regional level, to avoid 
compartmentalising the natural space, to 
guarantee appropriate ecological equilibrium and 
access for the population to high-quality 
recreational areas (p. 78);
3) Definition and integration of needs for urban 
facilities on a regional scale, including preferred 
sites and means of implementation (p. 8);
4) Definition, for the region and, co-ordinately, for 
each municipality, of maximum and desired levels 
of density and concentration of urban growth, 
according with the hierarchy of urban centres and 
actual growth needs (pp. 78-79);
5) Keeping, with a very high priority, the natural 
corridors between sensitive areas, namely the links 
Tagus–Coina–Arrábida, Corroios–Lagoa de 
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Albufeira–Arrábida and Tagus–Sado (p.79);
6) Reinforcing the natural corridor network with a 
regional status (p. 79);
7) Priority construction areas, with adequate urban 
facilities, should be indicated in the PDM and the 
PROTAML in order to avoid unstructured urban 
growth (p. 83);
8) Enlargement of the ‘urban defence and control area’ 
(Decreto-Lei no. 9/93 de 18 Março) and effective 
control of urban growth until the PROTAML is in 
force (p. 86).
The EIS recommended that all these and many 
other lesser measures be integrated in a regional land 
management plan. The evaluation committee 
considered that a specific plan for the southern bank 
was not adequate, since the PROTAML was under way 
and expected to cover the relevant issues. This 
assessment was duly confirmed by the Portuguese 
Government and the European Commission. Therefore, 
under the terms of the Funding Decision (CEC, 1994, 
article 5, no. 2), the references to a regional plan in 
the EIS should be interpreted as referring to the 
PROTAML. The EIS recommended further that the 
plan should be completed by June 1995 and that it 
should be implemented and in full force, at the very 
latest by the inauguration of the bridge (tomo II, 
vol. 3, pp. 78-80).
This problem was thoroughly discussed at CAO, as 
stated in the minutes of several meetings (CAO 
1996/1999a); the key discussion was on 25 February 
1998, but the issue was raised often, before and after 
this date. CAO adopted the position of just reporting 
whether the land management-related measures in 
the EIA were complied with or not, taking no further 
steps on the issue because it went beyond its mandate.
Successive drafts of PROTAML were issued in 
November 1996 - and then ordered back to redrafting 
without public discussion - and again in April 2000. 
This time, it was at last forwarded to public 
discussion. As yet, no date of approval has been set.
Let us examine the last draft of PROTAML 
(CCRLVT, 2000a). One must first note that the 
PROTAML will not be mandatory. This stems from a 
new Governmental philosophy, consecrated by the 
new Framework Law on Urbanism and Land 
Management, that regional plans should be advisory 
only. Originally, the PROTAML was intended to be 
mandatory and, if necessary, would override the 
PDM. If the advisory-only character is adopted, the 
goals of the EIS (and the goals of the PROTAML 
itself) will likely not be fulfilled.
Now about the key issues listed above (here 
PROTAML refers to the 2000 draft):
1) Mobility problems are well diagnosed in the 
PROTAML. Solutions and some financial means are 
identified, but no priorities are forwarded. Hence, 
no warranties about when needed facilities will be 
built, or in what order. Most projects, such as the 
southern bank tramway (which is absolutely 
necessary to solve congestion on the 25 Abril 
bridge), the road-rail-boat interchanges, the new 
boat links, the bus network update, the new heavy 
rail bridge, among others, are well behind 
schedule or yet to begin. In short, there is no 
regional transportation integration;
2) The PROTAML identifies the problem of 
recreational areas and makes some positive 
proposals, but no means of implementation;
3) The PROTAML identifies preliminarily the 
failures and needs for urban facilities. Means of 
implementation are not addressed. Issues like 
water or sewer systems are not considered in depth 
(note, this implies a significant estuary pollution 
impact);
4) No definition of level or density of urban growth is 
essayed, although some regional integration is 
discussed as a matter of strategy. By and large, the 
PROTAML was drafted under the assumption that 
it must accept all or nearly all intentions of urban 
growth from all municipalities, although it 
recognises this as a serious problem. No means of 
correcting this situation have been forwarded, 
although this is one of the key issues under 
discussion. Renewal of old urban areas is supposed 
to have high priority, but few means are allocated 
to this goal;
5) The natural corridors between the Tagus, the west 
coast and Arrábida are, already, almost 
completely gone, severed by uncontrolled urban 
growth (CCRLVT, 2000a). The corridor between 
the Tagus and the Sado estuaries still exists, but is 
not protected. The PROTAML proposes and 
attributes a high priority to the natural corridor 
network, but does not impose specific restrictions, so 
it may well be ineffective if municipalities do not 
co-operate. Note that, in the long term, this will 
be the worst threat to the Tagus Estuary SPA and 
other protected areas in the region;
6) The PROTAML does propose a regional natural 
corridor network, but it remains to be seen how 
mandatory it will be. This is intended to 
complement the ‘national ecological reserve’, 
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Reserva Ecológica Nacional, that is a 
classification with the goal, among others, of 
keeping a natural corridor network along rivers, 
coasts and mountains; but it is overridden by a PDM 
classification as urban area. Unfortunately, most of 
the former natural corridors in the region are 
already built-up, have become urban expansion 
areas or are cut short at municipality borders by 
unintegrated PDM. The much needed and promised 
review of the national ecological reserve by the 
Ministry of the Environment is well behind 
schedule;
7) There are no provisions in the PROTAML, or in 
most PDM, linking priority construction areas with 
adequate urban infrastructure and facilities. On 
the contrary, the few available data (CCRLVT, 
1999 & 2000b) indicate that a large share of the 
requests for construction in the region, in the past 
few years, fall outside consolidated urban areas, on 
formerly agricultural land;
8) An attempt was already made at the Portuguese 
Parliament to revoke the Decreto-Lei no. 9/93, 
without its scope ever having been enlarged, or the 
PROTAML approved. A dismissal decision was 
approved by the Parliament in the first reading in 
early 1999, with the votes of the ruling Socialist 
Party, but fell with parliamentary elections in 
October 1999. There are no warranties against this 
happening again.
In short, none of these key land management 
measures has been accomplished, nor are they likely 
to be assured by the 2000 version of PROTAML – 
despite the fact that this version represents a 
significant improvement when compared with earlier 
drafts.
The work of CAO
The Observation Committee for the new bridge 
over the Tagus, usually referred to by its acronym 
CAO (Comissão de Acompanhamento de Obra), was 
created on paper in early 1995. This first incarnation 
of CAO never worked, because it had no staff, no 
budget and no mandate.
Following the Memorandum of Understanding, 
CAO was reborn in July 1996, with its full complement 
of members (now including environmental NGO 
representatives), newly appointed Chairman and 
Secretary General, adequate staff and funding, and, 
above all, a clear mandate: to check on the 
Environmental Impact Assessment requirements 
(falling mostly on Lusoponte). The plenary of CAO 
worked as a body of representatives from Government, 
municipalities, environmental NGOs and, as non-
voting members, professional organisations. They used 
to meet monthly to review reports and establish 
policy (until 1998; the intervals between meetings in 
1999 being much longer). The plenary was supported 
by a technical staff of three or four and an 
administrative clerk. CAO worked on a regular basis, 
both on field observation and reviewing reports from 
Centro de Estudos e Monitorização Ambiental, 
(CEMA, Lusoponte’s environmental monitoring unit).
Early environmental violations by Lusoponte were 
prosecuted by the Ministry of the Environment, 
although decisions are still pending in court. Since 
CAO began working in mid-1996, no more major 
environmental violations by Lusoponte were reported. 
There have been many minor violations, duly reported 
by CAO staff and sooner or later (usually later) 
corrected. Lusoponte fulfilled the majority of impact 
mitigation measures, with delays varying from six 
months to a year.
An interesting by-product was that information 
gathered in relation to the bridge file (e.g. GATTEL, 
1991; CAO, 1996/98a;b;c; CEMA/Lusoponte, 1996/98) 
has already supported a number of MSc and PhD 
theses (e.g. Vasconcelos, 1996), and will likely 
continue to do so for years to come.
However, some critical issues that were never 
properly studied by Lusoponte, included air pollution 
monitoring and toxicology in marine life influenced by 
heavy-duty construction in the estuary. Despite this 
having been adequately reported by CAO, and despite 
pressure from the environmental NGOs at CAO and 
before Government, no action was taken against 
Lusoponte for these failures. 
On the other hand, most mitigation measures 
depending on public institutions, especially regarding 
urban and land use plans, were not complied with at 
all. CAO was powerless to have the municipalities 
and the Government implement proper land use plans. 
This prevented adequate solving of transportation 
problems (that, of course, were not solved at all by the 
new bridge) and allowed for a continuing unorganised 
urban growth on the southern bank of the Tagus, 
including in some cases within the SPA.
The bridge was opened in March 1998. In its first 
status report one month later, CAO stated that about 
half of the 160-odd environmental measures related to 
the construction phase were still not completed. Some 
one quarter were reported as irrecoverable violations 
(including the illegal dumping of contaminated 
sediment in the estuary in 1995). The rest were either 
done or recognised as irrelevant. As for the operation 
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phase, the vast majority of measures was not 
completed or even initiated at inauguration date.
The last verification, in the CAO final report 
(CAO, 1999), indicates that by late 1999 most of the 
measures related to the construction phase were at 
last, with two major exceptions: the same 
irrecoverable violations noted above (mostly related 
to illegal works in 1995), still pending in court; and 
the nuclear measures concerning land management 
that were the responsibility not of Lusoponte but of 
the Government and local authorities and were not 
performed at all. The report notes that many 
mitigation measures related to the operation were 
still not in place by December 1999, although the 
monitoring programme for the operation phase had 
been recently approved. The CAO final report was 
duly approved by the Minister for the Environment 
and CAO was thereafter disbanded. Observation 
duties relating to environmental monitoring fell then 
to the Direcção-General do Ambiente (Directorate 
General for the Environment), an agency under the 
Ministry for the Environment.
A global assessment of CAO work, issued by the 
environmental NGOs (Melo & Sequeira, 1999), 
concluded that CAO did a rather good job within its 
own mandate and restricted goals, managing to control 
Lusoponte adequately. It failed, however, to address 
broader, very critical issues stemming from the new 
bridge, such as land management, transportation 
system or long-term safeguarding of the Tagus Estuary 
SPA.
The European Union role
EU involvement in this project began in 1994, when 
the Portuguese Government applied for European 
funding for the new Tagus bridge under the Cohesion 
Fund. Despite overwhelming evidence that the project 
did not fulfil proposed goals, was technically poorly 
founded and went against European law, the 
Commission, under heavy pressure from the Portuguese 
Government, approved the financing in December 
1994. Conditions imposed upon the Portuguese State by 
the Commission included full compliance with 
Environmental Impact Assessment findings, the 
implementation of a regional land management plan, 
and the creation, under Portuguese law, of the Tagus 
Estuary Special Protection Area (which had been 
declared six years earlier but never implemented in 
practice).
As mentioned above, works on the bridge in 1995 
violated several mandatory environmental measures 
and hence the funding decisions. Warned by 
environmental NGOs, the Commission dallied and 
ignored the situation. This prompted the NGOs to 
launch an international publicity campaign, that 
began to gnaw at the apathy of the Commission. By 
early 1996, the newly appointed Commissioner 
Monika Wulf-Mathies, responsible for the Cohesion 
Fund, was frequently confronted with undeniable 
evidence of repeated infringement of European 
regulations and decisions concerning the new bridge. 
Especially tiresome was question time at the European 
Parliament, where several MEPs wanted to know why 
a useless, environmentally-destructive project was 
being funded by the Cohesion Fund. The new bridge 
over the Tagus became a case study in ‘how not to 
develop a project’.
By mid-1996, public outcry in the media and 
pressure from the European Parliament activated the 
Commission. With a series of not-so-nice letters and a 
couple of definitely rough meetings, the Commission 
pushed the Portuguese Government into honouring 
earlier commitments, and creating new, significant, 
compensatory measures. Most of these measures were 
actually negotiated by the Prime Minister personally 
at a lengthy meeting in May 1996 with the Portuguese 
environmental NGOs. It was an unprecedented gesture 
of recognition of the work and status of environmental 
NGOs. The approval of new measures represented a 
clear acknowledgement of former serious failures to 
comply with existing rules, although neither the 
Commission nor the Government ever admitted so 
explicitly, because that might have led to the 
cancellation of the bridge’s financing from the 
Cohesion Fund. The new measures, later confirmed by 
a Memorandum of Understanding, included the 
enlargement of the Tagus Estuary SPA and the 
creation of the CAO.
Following the authorisation of the CAO, the 
European institutions relaxed until 1998, when the 
Portuguese authorities began to disregard their 
commitments, again. And again, the reports of 
Portuguese environmental NGOs and the pressure of 
the European Parliament (a mission from the EP 
coming to Portugal in October 1998 was instrumental) 
pushed the Commission into withholding the 
remaining finance. This time, the issue was the 
failure of the Portuguese Government to comply with 
the funding decision regarding land use planning and a 
proper management plan for the Tagus Estuary SPA.
It is ironic that those who gave the go ahead for 
this project by ignoring their own regulations on 
environmental protection and economic viability, are 
now refusing to pay for it because certain land use 
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regulations (that are not usually considered part of 
European policy but were made mandatory in this 
case) have not been implemented. It is also a sign that 
European citizenship is progressing, but still has a 
long, long way to go.
Conclusion
The decision process that culminated in the 
approval and construction of the Vasco da Gama 
bridge may be regarded as a paradigm on how not to 
develop and finance a public works project. It remains 
to be unveiled how could it happen, both at national 
and European levels of decision-making. On the other 
hand, this project did foster a very interesting 
experience in post-evaluation, in a country – 
Portugal – where EIA post-evaluation hardly ever 
exists. The CAO worked very well as a co-ordinating 
body for monitoring purposes. It did accomplish its 
main goal, which was to control Lusoponte’s 
environmental performance and avoid further 
environmental crimes. On the other hand, CAO did 
very poorly in influencing public institutions – 
perhaps because no coercive instruments existed, and 
neither the Government nor the municipalities were 
really committed to the measures they were supposed 
to put in place. One of the lessons learned with CAO is 
paramount: it takes both political will and technical 
staff to achieve meaningful post-evaluation work.
One thing is certain: the long-term hope for the 
Metropolitan Area of Lisbon resides in the creation of 
proper regional and municipal land use plans. 
Unfortunately, it looks like this will only come to 
pass under the threat of the EU withholding the 
balance of the Cohesion Fund for the bridge. Thus 
European institutions still have a key role to play in 
the bridge.
To conclude, it should be said that a significant by-
product of the whole affair was the change in 
methods and posture of the authorities, both 
Portuguese and European; not only regarding the status 
and credibility of the environmental NGOs, but also 
regarding the general public and the decision-making 
process itself. The change towards more grounded 
decisions, if not openness, has became apparent in 
later projects, e.g. the Lisbon–Algarve southern 
highway, or the new Lisbon airport.
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Glossary
AML Área Metropolitana de Lisboa 
(Metropolitan Area of Lisbon)
GATTEL Gabinete para a Travessia do Tejo em 
Lisboa (Office for the Crossing of the 
Tagus at Lisbon)
GEOTA Grupo de Estudos de Ordenamento do 
Território e Ambiente (Environment and 
land use study group)
LPN Liga para a Protecção da Natureza 
(campaign to protect nature)
MOPTC Ministério das Obras Públicas 
Transportes e Communicações (Ministry 
of Public Works)
PROTAML Plano Regional de Ordenamento do 
Território da Área Metropolitana de 
Lisboa (Regional Land Use Plan for the 
Metropolitan Area of Lisbon)
PDM Plano Director Municipal (municipal 
land management plan).
